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Abstract
This paper looks at the interplay between the administration of  Islamic 
law in Malaysia in relation to Islamic family law and Islamic criminal law; 
and human rights. The paper examines the basis of  the administration of  
Islam in Malaysia in relation to its history and post-independence mandate. 
It looks at the position of  human rights under the Federal Constitution and 
the position of  the administration of  Islamic law under the constitutional 
framework. The research found that entrenching fundamental liberties through 
the supremacy clause resulted in the prevalence of  human rights over freedom 
of  religion. However, this is not consistently arrived at since the constitutional 
frameworks allows for plurality of  laws and exclusion of  personal law from 
the principle of  equality.
[artikel ini membahas kelindan antara administrasi hukum islam, hukum 
keluarga islam, hukum pidana islam, dan HAM di Malaysia. Artikel ini 
berbasis pada sejarah administrasi Islam di Malaysia sebelum dan sesudah 
kemerdekaan. Pembahsan lain artikel mengamati posisi HAM di bawah 
Undang Undang Federal Malaysia dan administrasi hukum Islam dalam 
kerangka konstitusional. Berdasarkan hasil riset menunjukkan dasar 
kebebasan pada supremasi klausul perundangan yang cenderung lebih utama 
HAM daripada kebebasan beragama. Meskipun demikian, hal ini tidak 
selalu konsisten ketika perspektif  konstitusi mengikuti pluralitas hukum 
dan eksklusi hukum personal dari prinsip kesetaraan.] 
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A. Introduction
Islam plays a significant role in the legal system of  Malaysia. The 
sidelining of  Islamic law during the intervention of  western imperial 
powers (involving the Portuguese, Dutch and British) beginning in the 
15th century did not cause the end of  its influence which revive with the 
independence of  Malaysia in 1957 and continue its ascendancy. Around 
the same time of  the Malaysian independence, the conception of  human 
rights gains currency in the international arena with the proclamation 
of  the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights (UDHR) by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1948. The decolonisation process and the 
drafting of  the UDHR share the same impetus, namely the World War 
II – the misery it caused and its ending. The revival and the expansion of  
Islam role in the administration of  justice are for some incongruent with 
the demand of  international human rights values. The intersect between 
the advancement of  the role of  Islam in the administration of  justice in 
Malaysia with the increasing importance played by international human 
rights values is considered in this paper by first looking at the history of  
the administration of  Islamic law.
B. The History of  Administration
Before the arrival of  the western colonial powers in the Malay 
Archipelago in the 15th century, Islamic influence has been widespread 
in that part of  the world. The influence of  Islam was not only confined 
to personal level but extended to the governance and the legal system. 
Speaking on Malaysia, the early process of  Islamisation was interrupted 
in the 18th century with the arrival of  the British in the Malay Peninsula.1 
The colonial powers, particularly the British, not only exploited the 
natural resources, but also imposed its own law to better exploit the 
colonial territories.2
1 See Syed Al-Attas Muhammad Naguib, Preliminary Statement on a General Theory 
of  the Islamization of  the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan 
Pustaka, 1969).
2 P.J. Drake, “The Economic Development of  British Malaya to 1914: An Essay 
in Historiography with Some Questions for Historians”, Journal of  Southeast Asian Studies, 
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In colonising the Malay states British, had preferred to adopt an 
indirect rule method. Under this method, British retained the Head of  
the State of  the territories but put in place a British officer as the de 
facto ruler.3 Although the terms of  the treaties between British and 
the Rulers of  the Malay States exclude British from interfering matters 
with regard to Islam and Malay custom, in practice the British had no 
qualm in interfering in matters of  Islamic affairs. Laws were enacted to 
bureaucratise administration of  Islamic affairs. While such legislation 
could be characterised as modernisation of  administration of  Islamic 
affairs, the effect of  it was also to pin down the area of  administration of  
Islamic law to mainly personal law matters.4 Positivist outlook of  the law 
where enacted laws, in contrast to unwritten law, reign supreme means 
that the largely uncodified laws of  Islam was assigned to the sideline. 
This reformulation of  Shariah is one of  the fundamental changes brought 
by the British imperial power.5 Islamic law was framed in English legal 
reasoning and fossilised in judicial precedent. The result became Anglo-
Muhammadan law. Up until the independence of  the Federation of  
Malaya in 1957, once a territorial law, Islamic was reduced in practice to 
matters of  personal law.
C. Post Independence Administration 
The nine Rulers who lead the nine Malay states were nine 
independent and sovereign states. However, in fact, the British and not the 
Rulers who were in control of  the administration of  the states through the 
office of  those British Residents posted in each state to give instruction 
to the Rulers except in matters of  Malay adat and religion. In addition, 
those  Malay states were grouped together administratively under what is 
known as the Federated Malay States (FMS) and the Unfederated Malay 
States (UFMS). On the basis of  this administrative grouping during the 
vol. 10, no. 2 (1979), pp. 262–90.
3 Rupert Emerson, Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule (Kuala Lumpur: 
University of  Malaya Press, 1964).
4 William R Roff, “Patterns of  Islamization in Malaysia, 1890s–1990s: 
Exemplars, Institutions, and Vectors”, Journal of  Islamic Studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (1998), pp. 
210–28. 
5 M.B. Hooker, “Introduction: Islamic Law in South-East Asia”, Australian 
Journal of  Asian Law, vol. 4, no. 3 (2002), pp. 213–31.
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British administration that the independent Malaya was fashioned as a 
federation. It means that the 9 Malay States agreed to come together to 
form a federal unit without losing their own identity and retaining some 
autonomous powers. It is important to take note of  this position because 
one of  the autonomous power maintained by the Rulers are their position 
as the Head of  Islam in their respective states.
The Federal Constitution that was enacted on the eve of  
the independence of  the Federation of  Malaya encapsulates this 
understanding by specifically mandating that the Rulers are the Head of  
Religion of  Islam in their respective. Consequently, matters related to 
Islam are put under the legislative and administrative authority of  each 
state. This point is essential in understanding why each state enact their 
own laws pertinent to Islam and the federation has no power to legislate 
the matters related to Islam for the states.6
Legislation which was in operation before the Independence 
continues to be reinforced in the Federation of  Malaya.7 One of  the 
major legislations remark in relation to Islam is the Administration 
of  Islamic Law enactments. One of  the bodies established under the 
legislation is the Muslim Religious Council or Majlis Agama Islam which 
continues to be operated after the Independence. The members of  the 
Council are from the top level of  State public servants including the 
State Secretary, State Legal Adviser, State Financial Officer, Mufti, the 
State Chief  Police Officer and those who are learning Islamic law. The 
Council is the main Islamic bodies since it aids and advises the Rulers on 
matters of  Islam. This, however, does not include the matters partinent 
to Islamic law and administration of  justice since the Mufti and Syariah 
courts have jurisdiction and power on those matters.8 The Council also 
has the responsibility to promote economic and social development of  
the Muslim community.9
The second main institution under the administration of  Islam is 
Mufti who is appointed by the Ruler whose functions is to aid and advise 
6 See “Mamat Bin Daud & Others v Government of  Malaysia”, Malayan Law 
Journal, vol. 1 (1988), p. 119.
7 The Commissioner of  Law Malaysia, Federal Constitution, 162.
8 Administration of  the Religion of  Islam (State of  Selangor), sec. 6.
9 Administration of  the Religion of  Islam (State of  Selangor), sec. 7.
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the Ruler in matters of  Islamic law. The Mufti is the second tier of  chief  
authority on Islamic law.10 In producing legal opinion, Mufti does not work 
alone, he is assisted by the Fatwa Committee whose members include the 
State Legal Adviser and person who are well versed in Islamic law.11 The 
issuance of  fatwa does not merely be based on the determination of  the 
Mufti, yet research and study are first carried out and discussed in the 
Fatwa Committee to prepare a fatwa. The prepared fatwa is then brought 
to the Muslim Religious Council to be recommended to the Ruler to 
get his assent to publish the fatwa in the government official publication 
(Gazette). The published fatwa is bound for every Muslim in the State 
except in matters of  personal observance as allowed under Islamic law.12
The third institution under the administration of  Islamic law is 
Syariah judiciary.13 The courts and the judges are established and appointed 
by the Ruler. It has three-tiers starting with the Syariah Subordinate Court, 
the Syariah High Court and the Syariah Appeal Court as the apex court. 
The Syariah courts have criminal jurisdiction over offences against the 
precepts of  the religion of  Islam which receive a wide definition as a 
general command or injunction, direction or a rule of  conduct under 
Islam.14 Nevertheless, the sentencing power of  the courts does not exceed 
fine of  five thousand Ringgit Malaysia, imprisonment of  5 years and six 
strokes of  light rattan. Cases in the Syariah Subordinate Court and the 
Syariah High Courts are heard before a single judge. However, in the 
Syariah Appeal Court, the appeal cases will be heard by a panel of  judges.
The provisions that establish the three institutions are the 
systemisation of  existing institutions that were already in place before or 
during the British intervention in Malaysia. These legislations brought the 
improvement and uniformity among the States of  these institutions, such 
as the three-tier court system and formation of  the Fatwa Committee. 
10 Administration of  the Religion of  Islam (State of  Selangor), sec. 45.
11 Administration of  the Religion of  Islam (State of  Selangor), sec. 46.
12 For a description of  the institution of  fatwa in Malaysia, see Farid Sufian 
Shuaib, Tajul Aris Ahmad Bustami, and Mohd Hisham Mohd Kamal, Administration of  
Islamic Law in Malaysia, 2nd edition (Petaling Jaya: Lexis Nexis, 2010).
13 Administration of  the Religion of  Islam (State of  Selangor), sec. 55.
14 Federal Court, “Sulaiman bin Takrib v Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu (Kerajaan 
Malaysia, intervener) and other applications”, Malayan Law Journal, vol. 6 (2009), pp. 
354–84.
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This brings us to the bodies that are responsible in producing these 
improvement and uniformity. One of  such bodies is the Syariah and Civil 
Law Review Committee that was established in 1988. The committee 
produced 6 model laws relating to the administration of  Islamic law such 
as Islamic family law, Islamic law of  evidence, Islamic criminal procedure, 
Islamic civil procedure and Islamic criminal offences. Under these model 
laws, Syariah courts were separated from the Islamic religious department 
to ensure the independence of  the Islamic judiciary. These model laws 
were then considered by each State legislative body to be enacted as state 
law. The State legislature consists of  the State Legislative Assembly and 
the Ruler (or the governor for States that to not have a Ruler).
The works of  these institutions, namely the Muslim Religious 
Council, the Mufti and the Syariah courts give impact on the life of  
Muslims which in turn may have bear on the enjoyment of  rights by the 
population. 
D. The Human Rights Regime under the Federal Constitution
The Commission entrusted to draft the Malaysian Federal 
Constitution was of  the opinion that the existing law in Malaya at that 
time would be able to give adequate protection under federal liberties 
without the need to incorporate a Bill of  Rights.15 The Commission 
firmly believed that the supremacy of  the constitution and the courts 
competency to protect those rights would avert any subversion. 
Nevertheless, the Commission did incorporate in its draft a chapter on 
fundamental liberties. The chapter provides, among others, right to life, 
freedom from slavery and freedom of  religion. 
To entrench these provisions, the Constitution proclaims itself  to 
be supreme and that any law which is inconsistent with the Constitution 
is void.16 For Minister for Home Affairs v Jamaluddin bin Othman, the decision 
of  the Supreme Court in invalidating a preventive detention order 
under the now repealed Internal Security Act 1960 against a Malay who 
converted to Christian and allegedly responsible for the conversion of  
15 Federation of  Malaya Constitutional Commission, Report of  the Federation 
of  Malaya Constitutional Commission, Colonial, no. 330 (London: HM Stationery Office, 
1957), para. 161.
16 Article of  the Federal Constitution.
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several Muslims shows the prominence of  freedom of  religion over 
national security.17 On the other hand, religious practices are also limited. 
The Supreme Court agreed that the authority has power to prohibit the 
wearing of  face veil by Muslim women in the civil service on the ground 
of  public order, wearing of  which according to the view of  a Mufti to 
be only commendable.18 
Similarly, the Federal Court (a court that replaced the Supreme 
Court) allowed the dismissal of  3 primary school children from the 
school for their failure to abide by the rule of  the school that prohibit the 
wearing of  serban (turban) against their protestation that the dismissal is 
a breach of  the freedom to practice their religion.19 Similar to the case of  
civil servant, the Federal Court took into account the fact that wearing 
of  serban is only commendable, not obligatory.
The restrictions on freedom of  religion are not confined to 
Muslims. The Malaysian courts have ruled that some restrictions over 
non-Muslims are constitutional taking into account the primary position 
of  Islam in the Federal Constitution. In a widely discussed case, the 
Federal Court ruled that a prohibition by the Ministry of  Home Affairs 
against a Malaysian Catholic weekly publication in using the word “Allah” 
in its Malay language section as a translation for the Christian God is 
valid.20
Equality is one of  the guarantees under the Federal Constitution. 
Under this guarantee, the constitution prohibits discrimination based 
on gender, race and religion. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not 
require similarity of  laws for all ethnic or religious groups.21 An exception 
to the right of  equality was made for personal laws. At the time of  the 
Independent, there were different laws applicable to different ethnic 
17 Supreme Court, “Minister for Home Affairs v. Jamaluddin bin Othman”, 
Malayan Law Journal, vol. 1 (1989). 
18 Supreme Court, “Hjh Halimatussaadiah Bte Hj Kamaruddin v Public Services 
Commission”, Malayan Law Journal, vol. 3 (1994).
19 Federal Court, “Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak (an infant, by his guardian ad 
litem Syed Ahmad Johari bin Syed Mohd) v Fatimah Sihi”, Malayan Law Journal, vol. 
4 (2006).
20 Federal Court, “Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of  Kuala Lumpur v 
Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors”, Malayan Law Journal, vol. 4 (2014), p. 765.
21 Article 8 of  the Federal Constitution.
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groups and different religious adherents.  Members of  ethnic Chinese for 
instance were applied rules that allow for polygyny and these particular 
rules remains applicable to them even if  a Chinese is of  a Christian faith. 
A Ceylonese Hindu on the other hand were said to be monogamous.
In other words, the entrenching of  the supremacy of  the 
constitution does not mean that ex facie human rights principles trump all 
other provisions. Due regard is given to plurality of  laws and freedom of  
religious community to administer their affairs.22 Even the constitutional 
provision that provide federal laws prevails over state laws should not be 
understood only on its veneer meaning.23 Federal laws could not defeat a 
state law that was enacted within the legislative competency of  the states. 
If  not, the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 could be said 
as the prevailing law even over Islamic family statutes enacted by states. 
This is far from the truth. If  this is the position taken in Malaysia, it makes 
it superfluous constitutional provisions that specifically allows for states 
to establish Syariah courts and to codify Islamic laws. In addition, the 
Federal Constitution also allows for the creation of  the Native Courts 
by two states in Borneo, namely Sabah and Sarawak that applies native 
customary law over the natives. Thus, the Constitution envisages three 
court systems in Malaysia. There would be not only three different 
laws in the three different court systems since there are more than 60 
ethnic groups in Sabah and Sarawak such as Melanaus, Ibans, Bidayuhs, 
Kadazan-Dusun, Bajau and Murut that may have their own customary 
laws. Irrespective of  the understanding of  the “equality before the law”, 
if  so derived from the equality principle under the fundamental liberties 
of  the constitution, it certainly does not mean one personal law for all 
communities in Malaysia.
E. The Interplay between Administration of  Islamic Law and 
Human Rights
As the Federal Constitution which contains provisions on 
22 For a discussion on legal pluralism, human rights and constitutionalism, see 
for instance Anicée Van Engeland, “The Balance Between Islamic Law, Customary Law 
and Human Rights in Islamic Constitutionalism Through the Prism of  Legal Pluralism”, 
Cambridge International Law Journal, vol. 3, no. 4 (2014), pp. 1321–48.
23 Article 75 of  the Federal Constitution.
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fundamental liberties is the supreme law, every law in Malaysia is subject to 
the Federal Constitution. This includes laws regulating the administration 
of  Islamic law and codified Islamic law. Thus, codified Islamic laws such 
as the enactment on mufti and Islamic offences are judged according to 
the constitutional framework.24  
Most of  the enactments in governing the affairs of  Muslims are 
included in the Administration of  Islamic Law enforcement provisions 
that is provided under each State a Council of  Islamic Religious Affairs. 
The enactments disponse that each Council is responsible to assist and 
to advise the respective Rulers of  the State, and the Council is the chief  
authority on Islamic matters (except on matters of  Islamic law and 
administration of  justice) next to the Ruler. The Council is also involved 
in the economic and social development of  the Muslim community.25
The law enactments also followed by the establishment of  Syariah 
Courts that administer Islamic law generally over Muslims in matters 
of  Islamic law. Apart from establishing the courts, it is provided for 
appointment and qualification of  Syariah judges and lawyers. It may for 
instance requires that Syariah judges and lawyers should be Muslims.26 
Another set of  ratification enacted Islamic offences such as sexual 
relations outside marriage and eating in public places during fasting 
month.27 The states of  Kelantan and Terengganu enacted laws which are 
labelled as qisas and hudud although this remains only in a statute book 
without implementation.28
24 For a view on the secular element of  the Federal Constitution, see Andrew 
Harding, “Malaysia: Religious Pluralism and the Constitution in a Contested Polity”, 
Middle East Law and Governance, vol. 4, nos. 2–3 (2012), pp. 356–85.
25 For further discussion on the Majlis, see Shuaib, Bustami, and Kamal, 
Administration of  Islamic Law in Malaysia.
26 See for instance Federal Subsidiary Legislation, Peguam Syarie Rules 1993 
- P.U. (A) 408/93, sec. 10; Laws of  Malaysia, Administration of  Islamic Law (Federal 
Territories) Act 1993, sec. 59. See also Federal Court, “Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah 
Persekutuan v Victoria Jayaseele Martin and another appeal”, Malayan Law Journal, vol. 
2 (2009), p. 309.
27 See for instance  Laws of  Malaysia, Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal 
Territories) Act 1997, sec. 15 and 23.
28 State of  Terengganu, Shariah Criminal Offence (Hudud And Qisas); Civil 
Appeal, “Muhamad Juzaili bin Mohd Khamis & Ors v State Government of  Negeri 
Sembilan & Ors”, Malayan Law Journal, vol. 3 (2015), p. 513.
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Issues were raised on the compatibility of  administration of  Islamic 
law with human rights. The first basic issue is the existence of  plurality 
of  laws in particular personal laws, laws that depends on status of  an 
individual – for instance religious and ethnic legal identity. Since Islamic 
law and Malay custom were the territorial law and the law of  the land 
in the Malay States,29 should we say the imposed law of  English law and 
laws of  other religious and ethnic grouping to be the divergent laws? 
In discussing plurality of  laws, usually Islamic law is seen as the law that 
diverted from the mainstream. However, the matrimonial law as indicated 
in the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act was enacted in 1976 and 
only enforced in 1982. In contrast, Islamic law and Malay custom were 
applied and even duly recognised by the colonial judges to become the 
applicable laws from the 15th century. Thus, the call to have a unitary law 
and for all to be subjected to the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) 
Act 1976 by certain section of  the society probably should rather be a call 
to return to Islamic law as the territorial law. Of  course this was not the 
intention of  those who made the call but on the contrary, the intention 
was for Islamic law to be negated and the Law Reform (Marriage and 
Divorce) Act 1976 to reign supreme. On the other hand, if  Islamic law is 
regarded as the applicable law, members of  other faiths have the option 
to choose their own laws and customs in accordance with pluralism 
under Islamic law.30 Thus, in the early Malaysian legal history, non-Muslim 
communities were allowed to apply their own personal law.
In respect of  Shariah offences, a challenge was made to its validity 
on the basis that the freedom of  religion as espoused in the Federal 
Constitution should mean freedom of  Muslims to act contrary to the 
commandment under Islamic law and to be free from being prosecuted 
under the Shariah offences. If  this argument is accepted, Shariah offences 
would be practically unenforceable because any Muslim prosecuted under 
Syariah offence could insist on claiming his religious freedom not to abide 
by the injunction of  his religion and thus could not be prosecuted. The 
Federal Court observed that under the constitutional framework, States 
29 See Liaw Yock Fang, Undang-Undang Melaka  (The laws of  Melaka) (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).
30 See for instance Abdur Rahman I. Doi, Non-Muslims under Shariáh (Kuala 
Lumpur: A.S. Noordeen, 1990).
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were given competency to enact Syariah offences and Syariah courts to 
have jurisdiction and power to hear prosecution and to sentence guilty 
parties. Thus, to say that freedom of  religion means Muslims could be 
free from being prosecuted in Syariah courts is absurd and would make 
the Federal Constitution meaningless.31
A more direct challenge to constitutionality of  a Syariah offence 
was made in Muhamad Juzaili bin Mohd Khamis & Ors v State Government of  
Negeri Sembilan & Ors.32 In this case several Muslim men have made up 
themselves as women by wearing feminine clothes and applying make 
up. They were arrested and charged under section 66 of  the Syariah 
Offences Enactment (Negeri Sembilan) 1992 in the Syariah court. The 
provision makes it as an offence for any male person who in public 
space wears woman attire or poses as a woman. They went to the civil 
courts challenging the constitutionality of  section 66 as it is inconsistent 
with, among others, the right to life and the right to equality.33 An 
intermediate appeal court rules that the provision is unconstitutional by 
being discriminatory and oppressive towards transsexual. However, the 
final court of  appeal reversed the decision on procedural ground.34 Thus, 
on the substantive law, it is a missed opportunity for the Federal Court 
to provide the final statement on this human rights issue.
Administration of  Islamic law in general does not transverse 
over the non-Muslims. The Federal Constitution also is emphatic 
that in matters of  offences, Shariah courts have jurisdiction only over 
Muslims. However, as a court of  law, the working of  administration of  
Shariah justice involves the process of  discovery, evidence collection 
31 Civil Appeal, “Muhamad Juzaili bin Mohd Khamis & Ors v State Government 
of  Negeri Sembilan & Ors”.
32 Civil Appeal, “Muhamad Juzaili bin Mohd Khamis & Ors v State Government 
of  Negeri Sembilan & Ors”,
33 The right to life under article 5 and the right to equality under article 8 of  
the Federal Constitution.
34 For a detailed comment on the Court of  Appeal’s decision, see Farid Sufian 
Shuaib, “Isu Perlembagaan dan Hak Asasi Manusia dalam Pentadbiran Keadilan Jenayah 
Syariah”, Kanun: Jurnal Undang-Undang Malaysia, vol. 27, no. 1 (2015), pp. 33–54. For 
another decision related to a question on indecency but not a Shariah offence see 
Federal Court, “Ooi Kean Thong and Another v Public Prosecutor”, Malayan Law 
Journal, vol. 3 (2006), p. 389.
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and enforcement of  orders. These processes may directly or indirectly 
have to do with non-Muslims. Families of  a deceased may give evidence 
as to whether the deceased practices during his life time consistent with 
practices of  a Muslim or a Buddhist in determining the faith of  the 
deceased.35 However, for some non-Muslims, even providing evidence 
to the Syariah courts is abhorrent and is to be considered as infringing 
on freedom of  religion. If  Syariah courts are the court of  competent 
jurisdiction on a matter, it is questionable to refuse to give evidence 
simply on the ground that the person does not belief  in laws applied 
by the courts. There are probably more than a few Muslims and non-
Muslims who do not believe in the laws applied by the civil courts. It is 
certainly unimaginable for such person to be excused from appearing 
before the civil court.36
Restrictions on converting out of  Islam under administration 
of  Islamic law are another problematic issue. The law provides that 
a Muslim continues to be regarded as a Muslim until Syariah courts 
declare otherwise. One of  the purposes of  this requirement is to prevent 
confusion created by irresponsible allegations against a Muslim that he 
is no longer a Muslim. In Malaysia this has occurred in relation to party 
political one-upmanship where a political party may accuse members of  
another political party of  being disbelievers because they do not share 
the same objectives, means and struggle to uphold Islam in Malaysia.37 
Thus it is an offence to accuse another Muslim of  being a non-Muslim. 
Another purpose is to provide clarity and preventing reckless self-
declaration of  being a non-Muslim in order to avoid responsibility for 
Syariah offences. This is because if  a person is a non-Muslim, Syariah 
courts have no jurisdiction over him and he could not be charged for 
Shariah offences such as sex out of  wedlock (zina). Some have attempted 
to avoid prosecution by declaring themselves to be apostates.38
35 Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Negeri Sembilan, “Permohonan Perisytiharan 
Status Agama Simati Nyonya binti Tahir”, Jurnal Hukum, vol. 21, no. 2 (2006), p. 221.
36 See further Farid Sufian Shuaib, Powers and Jurisdiction of  Syariah Courts in 
Malaysia, 2nd edition (Singapore: Lexis Nexis, 2008).
37 “Mamat Bin Daud & Others Vs. Government Of  Malaysia”.
38 Federal Court, “Kamariah bte Ali dan Lain-lain v Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan 
dan Satu Lagi”, Malayan Law Journal, vol. 1 (2005), p. 197.
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An effect of  this requirement is for those who genuinely want 
to apostate, they have to apply to Shariah courts for a declaration that 
they no longer a Muslim. Some consider this to be an unnecessary and 
cumbersome requirement which infringes their freedom to choose 
their religion. Azalina bte Jailani complained that such requirement 
infringed upon her freedom of  religion.39 According to her the statutory 
declaration that she made declaring herself  to be a Christian should 
suffice for the law to regard her as a Christian. This claim is plausible. 
However, in Malaysia the faith of  a person, particularly the faith as a 
Muslim have legal and administrative ramification. The personal law of  
a person including his liability under Shariah offences, his eligibility for 
affirmative action in education, licences and employment as conferred 
by the Federal Constitution, his qualification to be a Menteri Besar (Chief  
Minister) are all hinges directly or indirectly on his status as a Muslim. 
Thus, it is equally reasonable to have a court of  law to determine legally 
the faith of  a person. Since Syariah courts are the courts with expertise 
for such determination, Syariah courts is the place to go.
Azalina bte Jailani also complained that Syariah courts could very 
well refuse to grant such a declaration because Syariah judges regard 
apostasy as a crime. This is the major problem regarding apostasy; the 
distrust of  Syariah courts. Again, if  Syariah courts are the courts of  
competent jurisdiction, it would be problematic if  litigants refuse to 
submit to its jurisdiction. Even with the finding by a commission of  
inquiry of  corruption, “fixing” of  judicial appointment and collusion 
between politicians, business man and judges in the civil courts, it is still 
implausible for a party to say that they refuse to submit themselves over 
the jurisdiction of  the civil courts solely based on their distrust of  the 
courts.40 Similarly, relevant litigants that should appear before Syariah 
courts should not refuse to do the same based on feeling of  distrust. 
There could be the cases where application for a declaration of  apostasy 
is not readily forthcoming. However, Syariah courts when faced with 
39 Federal Court, “Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan”, Malayan 
Law Journal, vol. 4 (2007), p. 585.
40 See Jabatan Perdana Menteri. Unit Pemodenan dan Perancangan Tadbiran, 
Commission of  Enquiry on the Video Clip Recording of  Images of  a Person Purported to be an 
Advocate and Solicitor Speaking on the Telephone on Matters Regarding the Appointment of  Judges 
(Malaysia: Percetakan Nasional Malaysia, 2000).
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such appeal do grant the request. Thus, the statement that it is practically 
impossible for every request for apostate to be granted such declaration 
is wrong.41
The above cases show that the language of  human rights is well 
in place in the discourse of  the administration of  Islamic law not only 
in public conversation but also in the courts. The courts sometime have 
made strong decisions but in others could be perceived of  side-stepping 
the issue by relying on procedural ground.42 The increasing intensity of  
the human rights discourse could only mean more cases will be brought 
to the courts questioning administration of  Islamic law in human rights 
language. This is certainly good for the administrator to be on guard to 
ensure compliance on the protection of  human rights.
F. Globalisation of  Human Rights
The above discussions look at the interplay between the 
human rights under the Malaysian constitutional framework and the 
administration of  Islamic law. It would be incomplete in this age of  
globalisation if  no consideration is given to international human rights 
instruments. One such instrument is the Universal Declaration of  Human 
Rights 1948 (UDHR) which came to fruition through a resolution of  the 
General Assembly of  the United Nation.43 UDHR which is a declaration 
and not a treaty contains thirty provisions on human rights covering civil 
41 For a discussion on apostasy in Malaysia see for instance Mohamed Azam 
Mohamed Adil, “Law of  Apostasy and Freedom of  Religion in Malaysia”, Asian Journal 
of  Comparative Law, vol. 2, no. 1 (2007).
42 See Farid Sufian Shuaib, “Constitutional restatement of  parallel jurisdiction 
between civil courts and Syariah courts in Malaysia: Twenty years on (1988-2008)”, 
Malayan Law Journal, vol. 5 (2008), pp. xxxiii–l.
43 Resolution of  the General Assembly 217A. See also. Mohd Hisham Mohd 
Kamal, “Application of  International Human Rights Law in Malaysia”, in Human 
Rights Law: International, Malaysian, and Islamic Perspectives, ed. by Abdul Ghafur Hamid 
and Khin Maung Sein (Petaling Jaya: Sweet and Maxwell Asia, 2012), pp. 279–92; 
Mashood A. Baderin, “A Macroscopic Analysis of  the Practice of  Muslim State Parties 
to International Human Rights Treaties: Conflict or Congruence?”, Human Rights 
Law Review, vol. 1, no. 2 (2001), pp. 265–303; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Islamic 
Law, International Relations, and Human Rights: Challenge and Response”, Cornell 
International Law Journal, vol. 20, no. 2 (1987), pp. 317–35.
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and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights.44
A question has been raised in the Malaysian courts on whether 
UDHR is part of  Malaysian law. The Malaysian courts have given mix 
messages in this regard where one may find cases that answered the 
question in the affirmative and in negative response.45 As a resolution 
that contains the basic principles of  international human rights, UDHR 
should be given some regard. However, the Federal Court as the apex 
court decided that since Malaysia subscribes to the principle of  dualism 
where international law is not incorporated directly to the municipal 
law,46 the absence of  any transformation act to incorporate UDHR into 
Malaysian law, means that the Malaysian courts are not bound by UDHR.47
Malaysia has indeed ratified two treaties related to human rights 
namely the Convention on the Elimination of  All Discrimination Against 
Women 1979 (CEDAW) on the 4th August 1995 with some reservations 
and the Child Rights Convention 1989 (CRC) on the 19th March 1995. 
The country has enacted Child Act 2001 to conform and to transform 
the CRC into Malaysian law. With regard to CEDAW, Malaysia amended 
article 8 of  the Federal Constitution to include “gender” as one of  the 
grounds that cannot be used for discrimination and amended other laws 
to ensure gender equality such as right to receive accrued pension by a 
widow (of  a public servant) who remarried.
In ratifying CEDAW, Malaysia had, from the beginning, made 
declaration that the country’s accession is subject to the understanding 
44 On the question of  globalisation and Islamic law in Malaysia, see Farid Sufian 
Shuaib, “Kesan Globalisasi terhadap Undang-Undang Islam di Malaysia”, Kanun: Jurnal 
Undang-Undang Malaysia, vol. 29, no. 2 (2017), pp. 15–35.
45 LRC, “Suzana bt Md Aris v DSP Ishak bin Hussain & Yang Lain”, Malayan 
Law Journal, vol. 1 (2011), p. 107; LRC, “Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan 
Agama Islam Perak & Ors”, Malayan Law Journal, vol. 5 (2013), p. 552; LRC, “Merdeka 
University Berhad lwn Government of  Malaysia”, Malayan Law Journal, vol. 2 (1981), 
p. 356; LRC, “Pathmanathan a/l Krishnan (dikenali juga sebagai Muhammad Riduan 
bin Abdullah) lwn Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho dan Rayuan Yang Lain”, Malayan Law 
Journal, vol. 4 (2016), p. 455.
46 See for instance Ratno Lukito, “Segitiga Hukum Internasional, Municipal dan 
Islam: Memahami Kompetisi, Interaksi dan Resolusi Hukum di Malaysia”, Asy-Syir’ah, 
vol. 49, no. 1 (2015), pp. 161–91.
47 “Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor lwn Ketua Polis Negara”, Malayan Law 
Journal, vol. 4 (2002), p. 449.
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that provisions of  CEDAW are not contrary to Islamic law and the 
Federal Constitution.48 This declarative interpretation by Malaysia is in 
accordance with the Vienna Convention that allows for states to declare 
as to the meaning and the extent to which a state accept the effect of  
the treaty.49 For instance, CEDAW provides for women to have the right 
to choose a partner for marriage.50 Malaysian law, on the other hand, 
limited the choice for Muslim women to Muslim men.51 Similarly, there 
is also the need for wali that may be regarded as restricting the freedom 
to marry for Muslim women.
Additionally, if  we consider the status of  any international 
instrument, even a ratified treaty, the Malaysian legislature need to 
transform the international law into domestic law for it to be enforceable 
in a court of  law in Malaysia. Similar to the position of  UDHR that has 
been discussed above, there are mixed decisions produced by the courts 
with regard to the enforcement of  CEDAW. In support of  gender equality 
and commitment given by the government at the international level, the 
High Court proclaims that it is the duty of  the court to consider that 
CEDAW has legal effect in the Malaysian courts.52 However, the Court 
of  Appeal reaffirmed the transformation doctrine where ratification or 
accession is not adequate to enforce a treaty at the domestic level.53 The 
legislature needs to act on the decision of  the executive.
However, this is not the end of  the matter in dealing with 
international treaties. Recent human right treaties in particular have 
most of  the time included monitoring mechanism in its framework. The 
CEDAW Committee which consist of  independent experts is responsible 
48 Reservations to CEDAW, http://www:un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
reservations-country.htm. The remaining reservation cover articles 9(2), 16(a), 16(c), 
16(f) and 16(g).
49 Abdul Ghafur Hamid, “Reservations to CEDAW and the implementation 
of  Islamic family law: issues and challenges”, Malaysian Journal on Human Rights, vol. 3, 
no. 1 (2009), pp. 69–94.
50 Article 16 of  CEDAW.
51 Laws of  Malaysia, Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984.
52 Federal Court, “Noorfadilla bt Ahmad Saikin v Chayed bin Basirun & Ors”, 
Malayan Law Journal, vol. 1 (2012), pp. 832–47.
53 Court of  Appeal, “AirAsia Bhd v Rafizah Shima bt Mohamed Aris”, Malayan 
Law Journal, vol. 5 (2014), p. 318.
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in monitoring the compliance of  the convention.54 Member states of  
CEDAW have to submit reports to the Committee on the steps taken 
in compliance with the convention. Although technically the Committee 
has no power to enforce its view, it still could assert political pressure 
over compliance with its recommendation to the General Assembly of  
the United Nation. Recently, the Malaysian government delegation was 
questioned by the CEDAW Committee in Geneva.55 In this regard the 
issue of  universalism in human rights needs to be considered.
G. Universality of  Human Rights and Universalism in Human 
Rights
Mashood Baderin observed that distinction must be made 
between universality of  human rights and universalism in human rights.56 
Universality of  human rights refers to the universal quality or global 
acceptance of  the human rights idea, while “universalism in” human 
rights refers to the interpretation and application of  the human rights 
idea. Universality of  human rights has been achieved by the adoption 
of  UDHR in 1948 and acceptance of  the language of  human rights in 
international relations.
On the other hand, universalism in human rights has not been 
achieved by the absence of  consensus of  a common “universal value” 
for the interpretation and application of  human rights law. Cultural 
relativist argument is still being heard in the human rights discourse. 
Take for instance, the headscarf  ban in Europe. The European Court 
of  Justice in Luxemburg decided in March 2017 that companies can 
ban employee from wearing Islamic headscarves at work and this does 
not constitute discrimination or breach of  freedom of  religion. The 
54 Article 17 of  CEDAW.
55 Treaty bodies Sessions, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/
treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=1157&Lang=en; Yiswaree 
Palansamy, “Why choose fatwa over civil laws? UN committee asks Putrajaya”, malaymail.
com (21 Feb 2018), https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2018/02/21/why-
choose-fatwa-over-civil-laws-un-committee-asks-putrajaya/1582151, accessed 20 Aug 
2018.
56 Mashood A. Baderin, “Dialogue Among Civilisations as a Paradigm for 
Achieving Universalism in International Human Rights a Case Study with Islamic Law”, 
Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law, vol. 2, no. 2 (2001), pp. 1–41.
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basis of  the judgment is to enable companies and businesses to show 
religious and political neutrality. This has to be read together with other 
judgements that support policies which are in line with the culture and 
way of  life of  the European countries which is secular. Certainly the 
judgement of  the European Court of  Justice is not shared by Malaysian 
where the wearing of  turban by the Sikhs is regarded as manifestation 
of  their religious freedom. Hindus in Malaysia have also indicated that 
they should be able to wear the sign on their forehead. 
This relativist approach is also taken in reading the German 
constitution by upholding the prohibition of  questioning the holocaust 
against the Jews in World War II even in academic works.57 Such 
restrictions against free speech are not acceptable in the United States 
of  America.
It is not the purpose of  this article to debate the correctness or 
desirability of  the judgment of  the highest supranational court in Europe 
or the European state courts. What is to be highlighted is that for those 
European supranational and state courts, the protection of  the culture, the 
way of  life, political ideology and majoritarian sensitivities are legitimate 
grounds in moulding their application of  human rights, including the right 
of  equality and freedom of  religion. Thus, the courts in other countries 
and regions should also be given the space and the margin of  appreciation 
in shaping the application of  human rights in their countries.
H. Concluding Remarks
The place of  Islam in the public life, particularly in the 
administration of  justice, will continue to be debated in Malaysia. The 
basic document that establishes the federation of  Malaysia in the form 
the Federal Constitution clearly provides for Islam to have a place in the 
public life, including in matters of  administration of  justice and Muslim 
affairs. The Constitution allows for codification of  Islamic law and 
establishment of  Shariah courts. What is left to be debated is the purview 
57 Ronald Krotoszynski, “Free Speech Paternalism and Free Speech 
Exceptionalism: Pervasive Distrust of  Government and the Contemporary First 
Amendment”, SSRN Scholarly Paper, no. ID 2655700 (Rochester, NY: Social Science 
Research Network, 2015); Michel Rosenfeld, “Hate Speech in Constitutional 
Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis”, SSRN Scholarly Paper, no. ID 265939 (Rochester, 
NY: Social Science Research Network, 2001).
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of  such enactment over the life of  Muslims and the aspired result from 
the interplay between human rights and administration of  Islamic law.  
Other Muslim countries also confront the intertwined issues of  
human rights and the application of  Islamic law.  Although not all states 
that have majority Muslims population place administration of  Islamic 
law in the mainstream as in Malaysia, the states still has to face the issue 
of  Islam and human rights.58 In Indonesia for instance, Islamic family law 
is applicable for Muslims.59 Some issues, such as interfaith marriages and 
dissolution of  marriages on the ground of  apostasy, invite the issue of  
human rights.60 More issues arise in the special province of  Aceh where 
the special province establishes Syariah courts to administer Islamic 
law including Shariah offences.61 Observing what transpired in Muslim 
countries, some opined that the legislature and the judiciary have the 
ability to mould Islamic law to be consistent with international human 
rights law.62 Nevertheless, as what transpired in Malaysia, the legislature 
and the judiciary of  each of  the countries should be given space to shape 
their own law. 
58 See for instance Indonesia as the Pancasila-based state; Turkish as the self-
proclaimed secular state; and Algerian, Jordanian and Yemeni constitution proclaims 
Islam as the religion of  the state.  See further Nisrine Abiad, Sharia, Muslim States and 
International Human Rights Treaty Obligations: A Comparative Study (London: British Institute 
of  International and Comparative Law, 2008).
59 Euis Nurlaelawati, “Muslim Women in Indonesian Religious Courts: Reform, 
Strategies, and Pronouncement of  Divorce”, Islamic Law and Society, vol. 20, no. 3 (2013), 
pp. 242–71.
60 Euis Nurlaelawati, “For the Sake of  Protecting Religion: Apostasy and its 
Judicial Impact on Muslim’s Marital Life in Indonesia”, Journal of  Indonesian Islam, vol. 
10, no. 1 (2016), pp. 89–112.
61 Asma T. Uddin, “Religious Freedom Implications of  Sharia Implementation 
in Aceh, Indonesia”, University of  St. Thomas Law Journal, vol. 7, no. 3 (2010), pp. 603–48.
62 Abiad, Sharia, Muslim States and International Human Rights Treaty Obligations: 
A Comparative Study, p. 173; The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government 
Policy, Dynamism in Islamic Activism: Reference Points for Democratization and Human Rights 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), p. 140.
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